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Introduction to Nakamura Yūjirō 
and his Work
John W. M. Krummel
Nakamura Yūjirō (?????) (1925-) is one of the more signifi cant 
philosophers of contemporary Japan.1 He graduated from the Faculty of Lit-
erature at the University of Tokyo in 1950 and spent his teaching career from 
1965 to 1995 at Meiji University, specializing in philosophy and intellectual 
history. Probably the most important theme that reappears throughout Na-
kamura’s philosophical project of his mature years is the concept of ‘common 
sense’ (kyōtsū kankaku ????). Th ere are additional issues that are impor-
tant in his philosophy, such as the imagination and place. In the following I 
touch upon these concepts while outlining his general trajectory leading up 
to, and providing the context for, the essay following this introduction. And I 
end with a discussion of the relevance of this piece as well as his general proj-
ect. I then briefl y describe the context for the essay.
Common Sense
Nakamura discusses common sense, the content of section three of the fol-
lowing article, through a variety of works.2 But the most important work that 
explicates this idea is his 1979 Kyōtsūkankakuron ? ??????On Com-
mon Sense) (Nakamura 1983; hereafter referred to as OCS). 
Nakamura starts with the point that human beings exist not merely as 
individuals but always within some sort of a meaningful social framework—a 
‘world’—assumed in our perceptions (OCS, pp. 1-4). Perception must assume 
the world as its necessary context—an intersubjective horizon of experience 
(OCS, p. 86-87). Common sense usually has this meaning of a sense that people 
possess common to a society (OCS, p. 7). In Japanese this is called jōshiki (??). 
It is our common understanding based on the self-evident or obvious within 
the common semantic fi eld of a particular society or culture at a given time, 
but which we hardly ever notice (OCS, p. 5). However, it can also block our 
view of what is not obvious or self-evident. 
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Nakamura wants to remind us of the original meaning of the term, com-
mon sense, that is, as a sense that is common to, coordinates and integrates the 
various sensations (sense), a synthetic sense that gathers and arranges the so-
called fi ve senses (OCS, p. 7). Th e meaning of common sense as the faculty 
of judgment common to society became its more popular meaning only in 
eighteenth century England. But Nakamura traces it back to the humanis-
tic lineage that stems from the Roman classics, includes Cicero, and extends 
up to the Renaissance (OCS, pp. 7, 152-153). He traces its older and more 
originary sense, on the other hand, to Aristotle’s koinē aisthēsis or what in 
medieval times became known in Latin as sensus communis. Common sense in 
this signifi cance is what is in phase with, and required by, the imagination as 
its ‘seat’, serving as the contact point between sensitivity and reason (OCS, p. 
199). Aristotle (1941, p. 582) understood common sense as such as a primor-
dial sensible faculty that compares, distinguishes, and coordinates the distinct 
senses.3
René Descartes, inheriting that Aristotelian notion of common sense, re-
fers to the sensorium commune that is the organ or seat of the sensus communis 
(sens commun) and identifi es it with a small part of the brain, the pineal gland 
(in Meditations IV, On Man, and On the Passions I) (OCS, pp. 174-176). At 
the same time, he distinguishes sens common as sensible and bodily from con-
ceptual thought and reason, and devalues it together with the imagination as 
the cause of error (OCS, pp. 178-179, 343). Although the tradition based on 
this Aristotelian sense of common sense occupied the main current up to the 
period of the Renaissance (OCS pp. 152-153), since the beginning of moder-
nity it became forgotten and today remains only as an undercurrent.
Historically, there is a relationship between the two lineages of common 
sense—the Aristotelian-Scholastic line and the line from the Roman classics 
to Renaissance humanism—when Cicero took Aristotle’s sensus communis and 
changed its meaning from the integration of the fi ve senses to the faculty of 
sound judgment common to a people. Cicero changed its meaning by empha-
sizing ceaseless inquiry, open debate, the value of probability in the pursuit 
of truth, and the importance of consensus and agreement concerning public 
issues (OCS, pp. 240-241). And he proposed a rhetorical form of knowledge 
that appeals to common sense in this social sense and deals with concrete 
practice (OCS, pp. 288-289). In the eighteenth century Giambattista Vico (in 
his Scienza Nuova) inherited this humanist notion of sensus communis from 
Cicero and, in his anti-Cartesian stance, advanced his understanding of it as 
the criterion of practical judgment over which a community is in consensus. 
Parallel to this Vico advocated rhetorical knowledge as the knowledge of prob-
able truths founded on common sense. Nakamura inherits this understand-
ing of common sense as what facilitates the integration and interpretation of 
meanings, serving as the logic of the ‘life world’ (OCS, pp. 42-43). 
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Nakamura thus points to two aspects of common sense: the faculty of re-
ceptivity within an individual human being that integrates the various senses; 
and the faculty of judgment held in common among people. And each sense 
has been the focus of one or other of two distinct intellectual pedigrees in the 
history of Western thought (OCS, pp. 152-153). In Nakamura’s view, the two 
are supposed to correspond (OCS, p. 10) for the synthetic integration of the 
various senses ought to found the communal standards of a society and the 
latter ought to be an externalization of the former. But in turn on the basis of 
common sense (jōshiki) as the socially habituated, taking root at the uncon-
scious level, our common sense (kyōtsū kankaku) can become fi xed in its mode 
of integrating the fi ve senses (OCS, pp. 28-29). Certainly habituation as such 
on some level is convenient and necessary—indeed indispensable for social 
life—for example in the act of buying a ticket to ride public transportation 
or waiting for the green light to cross a cross-walk (OCS, pp. 29, 32). Yet it 
can become congealed as what is merely “common place,” mere convention, 
through captivation to invisible institutions, to the extent that it loses—and 
even obstructs—the ability to deal with the abundant diversity and altera-
tions of reality (OCS, pp. 30, 188). In such situations common sense needs 
to be questioned as inadequate in its grasp of reality (OCS, p. 11). Th is entire 
issue brings the two senses of common sense—kyōtsū kankaku and jōshiki—
together (OCS, p. 280). For it is not simply social convention that becomes 
congealed but, even deeper, the integration of the senses so that one no longer 
grasps reality in its diversity, and it becomes necessary to rearrange the senses 
in a way that would re-activate them and retrieve the original activity of com-
mon sense (OCS, p. 30).
Nakamura distinguishes common sense in its healthy recombination of 
the two aspects from reason’s ability to analyze, divide and partition. Com-
mon sense in its ideal function is rather what takes the whole picture into 
view and spontaneously responds to the ever-changing demands of the real 
world and its concrete situations. He refers to Hannah Arendt (1998 [1958], 
pp. 283-284), according to whom common sense originally meant the sense 
that adapts each of the fi ve senses to the world common to everyone (OCS, 
pp. 151, 324.n.11). According to Nakamura, the critique and requestioning 
of knowledge and theory today leads us to the roots of the self-evidence of ev-
eryday experience. On this basis he thinks it would be meaningful to retrieve 
the original idea of common sense to shed new light on what we mean by 
common sense. Th e various contemporary issues surrounding the grounding 
of perception—body, identity, language, critique, time and space, landscape, 
institution, consciousness, etc.—all relate to, and converge on, this issue of 
common sense (OCS, p. 9). Moreover there is the issue of the disintegration 
of the senses when the inherited social paradigm no longer seems applicable. 
Nakamura refers to Kimura Bin (???) (1931~), who takes both schizo-
phrenia and depersonal neurosis to be such pathologies, whereby common 
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sense as the faculty that orients us to the world as whole is no longer at work 
(OCS, p. 44-46).
In any case it is this recognition of common sense as what constitutes or 
perceives that horizon of the world along with rhetoric as a form of knowledge 
that cognizes the possibilities of that horizon that leads Nakamura in section 
three of the following essay to a discussion of Nishida Kitarō’s concept of place 
as well as the “predicate”-nature of the Japanese language. If it is common 
sense rather than pure reason that is the faculty for making practical decisions 
within specifi c communal contexts, it is also common sense that compre-
hends language in its natural use with all of its logical ambiguity or polysemy, 
metaphorical expressions, and contextuality. And it is also common sense that 
relates to place (topos, locus), connecting us to the environment. Th e rational 
subject cannot be abstracted from that contextualizing interrelationality of 
common sense, language, and place. 
Place 
Place (basho ??) was an important concept in the thought of Nish-
ida Kitarō (?????) (1870-1945), famous as the founder of the Kyoto 
School of philosophy. Nakamura raises the issue of place as it comes up in 
Nishida’s “logic of place,” and believes it to have contemporary signifi cance. 
He attempts to reconceptualize this theme by relating it to various issues, 
without relying on Nishidian jargon (OCS, pp. 300-302, 304; 2001b, p. 2). 
Before looking at Nakamura’s reading of Nishida, I will fi rst give a short expli-
cation of Nishida’s theory in order to help contextualize the Nakamura essay 
that follows.
Nishida in his 1926 essay ‘Place’ (Basho) attempted to overcome the 
subject-object dichotomy that raises the question of how two ontologically 
distinct entities are related in the process of cognition. His method was to 
de-focus attention away from the object—the grammatical subject (shugo ?
?) of a judgment—and to turn attention towards what encompasses the di-
chotomized terms in the fi rst place, allowing for their relationship. Th is led 
him to his notion of place (basho), which he also regards as what becomes 
the predicate (jutsugo ??) in that it is what determines and contextualizes 
the grammatical subject. He thus views cognition and judgment as founded 
upon, contextualized on the basis of, the self-determination or diff erentia-
tion of place that in cognitive terms is a non-diff erentiated, un-objectifi able, 
transcendental unity. Th e dichotomized terms are but abstractions, articula-
tions, objectifi cations, of that concrete unity, which we are in touch with prior 
to our cognitive or judicative acts. Nishida understands place in a variety of 
ways, such as in terms of the fi eld of consciousness (ishiki no ba ????) 
or the world (sekai ??) of human interactivity. But the deepest and most 
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foundational place for Nishida is what he calls the place of absolute nothing 
(zettai mu no basho ??????) that encompasses, implaces, all, includ-
ing opposites and contradictories.4
 Nakamura (in section two of the following essay) fi nds Nishida’s theory 
of place as what is ‘predicate-like’ (jutsugoteki ???) to be analogous to 
Tokieda’s Motoki’s (??? ?) (1900-1967) linguistic theory of the Japanese 
language. Tokieda focuses on one’s situatedness assumed by language in terms 
of a ‘scene’ or ‘fi eld’ (bamen ??)—neither strictly objective, nor purely sub-
jective—implied in, and broader in signifi cance than, the literal meaning of 
a sentence. Nakamura suggests there may be something unique to Japanese 
thought traditionally, due to its language, in its recognition of ‘rhetorical 
knowledge’, which had been traditionally suppressed in Western modernity. 
As opposed to a narrower view that would reduce language to the object-
indicative, Nakamura believes Tokieda’s theory points to a view to language in 
terms of common sense that involves a reconsideration of the positive signifi -
cance of imagery in language to underscore the logos of common sense (OCS, 
pp. 286, 289-290, 344).
Nishida’s relating of place to a ‘nothing’ (mu) can easily lend its reading 
to mystical terms. Nakamura fi nds Nishida’s ‘absolute nothing’ (zettai mu ?
??) as such to be a concept that excludes the dimension of relativity. He 
believes this closes the path to unfolding various concrete issues belonging to 
place (Nakamura 1995, p. 20). Nishida’s pupil, Miki Kiyoshi (more on him 
below) attempted to overcome Nishida’s limits by incorporating discoveries 
from the social sciences, but his career was cut short by imprisonment and 
death. Nakamura sees his own project as inheriting Miki’s legacy. In a variety 
of works, Nakamura thus spells out four principle ways in which place as such 
has become an issue for us today: 1) place as ontological ground; 2) place as 
somatic, the body; 3) place as symbolic space; and 4) place as the linguistic 
or discursive topos involved in concrete inquiry or argument (OCS, pp. 258, 
295; 2001a, p. 68; 2001b, p. 30). Th ese aspects of place are also the topic 
Nakamura covers in the fi rst section of the following essay.
Th e issue of place, according to Nakamura, became neglected in modern 
philosophy as its opposite concept, the epistemological subject, became the 
substratum instead. Nakamura takes Descartes’ statement, “I think, therefore 
I am,” as not only expressing the desire of modern man for independence but 
to also be an epochal claim that provided its grounding (2001a, pp. 65-66). 
But as the possibility of the subject’s independence became realized, its exces-
sive pursuit has begun to undermine the very foundation of its sustenance, 
e.g., the eco-system. In turn this has put the autonomous inner reality of the 
ego-subject into question, turning much of our focus upon the community 
(kyōdōtai) or the native environment (koyū kankyō) (2001a, pp. 66-68). Place 
as ontological ground thus involves a variety of concrete issues that are urgent 
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today, including the global environment as the eco-system, the native envi-
ronment of living things, the community of human beings, the realm of the 
unconscious, etc., issues that are not necessarily distinct (1995, p. 20).
Place as ground is ontological place, the foundation for the establishment of 
being, shaping the fi eld wherein the ego is constituted and from out of which we 
eventually emerged and emancipated ourselves as individuals (OCS, pp. 258-
259). As a paradigmatic example of this correlative and dynamic relationship 
between self (subject) and place (substratum), Nakamura discusses in several of 
his works, including the following essay, the relationship between the hero (the-
atrical actor, leading role) and the chorus (members of the performing group) in 
ancient Greek tragedy, and the historical emergence of the former out of the lat-
ter (e.g., OCS, p. 259ff ; 2001a, pp. 66-67). Nakamura laments that the modern 
ego’s gradual congealing and independence signifi es the severance of its ties to, 
and loss of, the chorus-like substratum (2001a, p. 67).
A prime case of such a substratum is one’s native environment—the Um-
welt or environing world—having biological and ecological connotations, 
permitting the sustenance and activity of the individual. But Nakamura adds 
that it can have a broad “spiritual” signifi cance as the concrete manifestation 
of the chorus-like community or unconscious, as indicated in the expression 
genius loci (OCS, pp. 261-262; 2001a, pp. 67-68). Th e community, the un-
conscious, and the native environment can all be place as ontological ground 
in this sense, but there are other senses of place as well.
Place as the ego’s ontological ground overlaps with somatic place, the 
body. On the one hand the ego-subject cannot exist without having a body as 
its substratum. On the other hand, an external spatial place in turn is given 
meaning and articulated through one’s bodily existence (OCS, p. 262; 2001a, 
p. 68-69). Th e active body we live opens us to the world, shaping its horizon 
(2001a: 69). Th e body as place is thus not the physiological body bounded by 
skin but rather the phenomenological body that spreads outward to include 
the extended space of perception (1995: 20). And implicated in this is a com-
munal sense. Place as such is a correlate of common sense (OCS, p. 48).
Th e internal articulation of space can also happen in the dimension of 
symbols, leading to the notion of place as symbolic space. As an example, Na-
kamura mentions sacred space or mythical or religious space as distinguished 
from ordinary or secular space, and established through the selection of a 
place, such as a mountain peak or the interior of a forest, as having special 
meaning, usually taken to possess a self-coherent wholeness, so that shrines or 
places of worship are built there (OCS: 266-267; 2001a, p. 69-70). As we can 
see the above three aspects of place—as ground, somatic, and symbolic—all 
overlap one another and moreover touch upon the issue of common sense. 
Lived place is the object of common sense in its most characteristic sense 
(OCS, pp. 269-70). It is also the horizon of the world where we are interrelat-
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ed with one another and with thing-events. Because it involves us in manifold 
ways, we can deal with it only by relying on common sense (OCS, p. 270).
Th e fourth kind of place is linguistic or literary topos for discourse and 
inquiry as found in the theory of topics (topica) in ancient rhetoric. In ancient 
times, the method of disputation and accumulating ideas in regard to a spe-
cifi c theme was called topica. According to Nakamura, this was related to the 
strongly placial character of language (1995, pp. 20-21). In Aristotle, topics 
had to do with what kind of, and how much, matter an argument is to deal 
with and where it is to begin. For Cicero (1949, §§7-8, pp. 386-387; 2003, 
p. 119), in order to advance an adequate argument, we need to know its hid-
den place or topic (locus, topos) that allows us to uncover the issue (OCS, pp. 
270-271; Nakamura 2001a, pp. 70-71). Topos in this sense is the contextual 
locale where a group of points concerning a certain issue for discussion can be 
found (OCS, pp. 162-163). So topica is rhetoric that makes use of such topoi, 
and according to Nakamura, its basis is common sense.
Because topics (topica), in dealing with concrete matters, has to be based 
on probability, it came to be regarded as uncertain and thus ignored in mo-
dernity (OCS, p. 271; 2001a, p. 71). Yet Nakamura points out that the prob-
able, when tied to discovery, has an extremely positive signifi cance. Descartes’ 
criteria of truth—clarity and distinctness—cannot apply to anything beyond 
the realm of mathematics and natural science. It does not apply to history or 
the humanities (OCS, pp. 272-273). Recognizing this, Vico (1965, p. 13) 
stated that common sense (sensus communis) based on probable truth is both 
the criterion of practical judgment and the guiding criterion of speech and 
debate (OCS, pp. 271-272).5 Common sense is the sense that provides or 
uncovers (contextual) places (topoi) for our communal understanding6 amidst 
the multi-sidedness of human existence (OCS, pp. 164-166, 272). Nakamura 
makes the point that within the life-world, a concrete issue possesses a coher-
ence of its own for which we need to discover its topos—the context wherein it 
coheres—while avoiding quasi- or abstract universal explanations on the one 
hand and utter individualism that would abandon explanations on the other 
hand (OCS, pp. 275, 301). We can only grasp the meaning of history in the 
form of an approximate sense possessed by the assemblage of facts and belong-
ing to the multi-sided consideration of concrete issues (OCS, pp. 276, 301). 
Related to this, Nakamura regards what have been called generative ideas—
ideas that through their polysemantic, multi-layered, and dynamic nature give 
rise to other ideas in history—as linguistic topoi. Like topoi in ancient rhetoric, 
they are loci where various meanings are implicit and stored (OCS, pp. 277-
278), waiting to be uncovered by common sense. Nakamura makes the point 
in section three of the following essay that common sense relates to place in 
all of the above signifi cances.
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Imagination 
Another major Japanese philosopher who Nakamura discusses in a variety 
of works is Nishida’s student, Miki Kiyoshi (???) (1897-1945). What 
interests Nakamura in Miki’s work is especially his theory of the imagination. 
Miki (1968, p. 453) attempted to surpass Nishidian philosophy by overcom-
ing what he took to be its defects (Nakamura 1995, p. 5),7 but before he 
was able to accomplish this task, he was arrested for harboring a Communist 
friend and died in prison. Ironically World War II had already ended a month 
prior to his death but amidst post-war confusion, political prisoners of the 
previous regime had not yet been released (1995, p. 5).
In his attempt to uncover the concrete unity of the subjective and the ob-
jective, Miki arrived at the notion of the (creative) imagination (kōsōryoku ?
??) (in Kōsōryoku no ronri, Logic of the Imagination, 1937), whose function, 
Kant had recognized in the fi rst and third Critiques (1995, pp. 6-7, 10n). 
For Aristotle the imagination is passive (pathos) in being worked upon by the 
sense impressions. Yet because the object’s activity upon it is indirect, medi-
ated by the senses, the imagination escapes the object’s constraint to become 
active and creative (OCS, pp. 228-229). Th is is why Descartes devalued the 
imagination as a source of error. Miki however focuses upon that creative 
power, takes the imagination to be a faculty that operates on a collective level 
in the construction of civilization or culture, and takes its logic to be a “logic 
of form” (katachi no ronri ????).8 Consequently, as Nakamura explains 
in section three of the following essay, Miki felt that with his notion of the 
imagination as the faculty of the formation of forms he had been approach-
ing Nishidian philosophy with its notion of the self-formation of the formless 
arising out of the place of nothing (1995, pp. 7, 10). Miki’s theory, in Naka-
mura’s view, provides a more concrete expression for Nishida’s theory by tying 
Nishida’s formulations of place to the concrete structures and institutions of 
society and history. Nakamura therefore suggests, in section three of the essay, 
a parallel between his thought and Miki’s when he says that he stands in the 
same current of awareness of issues as Miki and that while Miki, borrowing 
Kant’s terminology, proposed a ‘logic of imagination’, he himself, borrowing 
Aristotle’s terminology, proposes a ‘theory of common sense’.
Relevance 
Th ere are several points where Nakamura’s work is relevant for theorists of 
the social imaginary and readers of Social Imaginaries. Studies of the imagina-
tion and sensus communis in intellectual history provides a historical context 
to contemporary discussions. But in addition to outlining that intellectual 
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history, Nakamura’s investigations also captures some of the unique ways in 
which modern and contemporary Japanese philosophy can contribute to that 
discussion.
Common sense for Nakamura provides the horizon of self-evidence that 
shapes a certain layer of thought and behavior within a given time, society, 
culture, etc. (OCS, pp. 280-282). But when the ground it shapes begins to 
fragment and becomes overly diverse, we lose our sense of normality and are 
overcome with anxiety as we come in touch with the not-self-evident, the 
non-ordinary (OCS, p. 280). In periods of crisis when the horizon is thus 
shaken, a rearrangement or recomposition of ‘knowledge’ becomes neces-
sary (OCS, p. 280). From the invention of the printing press to the recent 
emergence of the electronic media, our central nervous system has come to 
receive increasingly irresistible stimuli. What was at fi rst an expansion of the 
self through new media of communication has, in Nakamura’s view, led to a 
sensory paralysis and an amputation of the self. What is necessary, more than 
ever, then is the rearrangement or recomposition of the senses and, borrowing 
Marshall McLuhan’s (1964, p.45) terms, the discovery of a ‘new sense ratio’ 
for the distribution of the various senses (OCS, p. 59) that would allow us to 
overcome the paralysis caused by technological media. As each new media 
invention—such as the radio or photography—changes the distribution ratio 
of sensation, altering our whole sensory experience, we need a method for 
managing, from a psychological and social perspective, the alteration of the 
distribution ratio of sensation (OCS, p. 61). For this, common sense along 
with the imagination, in its constitution of the horizon of meaning, cannot 
be ignored as issues of inquiry. And on the basis of such an understanding of 
common sense Nakamura believes the rhetorical form of knowledge needs to 
be re-acknowledged (OCS, p. 301).
Operating on the collective level among people sharing cultural values, 
common sense motivates the socio-culturally endorsed way of interpreting 
meaning and nurtures the emotions common to a group of people. Naka-
mura’s theory of common sense should thus have something to contribute to 
current discussions of the imagination and much of what he says might be 
rephrased in terms of the social imaginary. In all of Nakamura’s examinations 
of Nishida’s notion of place or predicate, Tokieda’s notion of the linguistic 
scene, and Miki’s notion of the imagination, what Nakamura notices is a ho-
listic image—a knowledge of the horizon constitutive of the world (or ‘world 
picture’)—necessary for knowledge. Th e arrangement of the senses, working 
in concert with collective understanding, into a coherent meaningful picture 
of the world, resonates with an understanding of the social imaginary in the 
constitution of a meaningful world for a collective. 
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Context of the Essay 
Th e following essay was originally given as a lecture in France in Fall of 
1983. Previously Nakamura had published another essay and given two lec-
tures in the French language.9 As a result he was invited to give a lecture 
at the Collège international de philosophie, which at the time was presided 
over by Jacques Derrida. Th e talk titled, ‘Th e “Logic of Place” and Common 
Sense’ was subtitled, ‘A Th eme in Contemporary Japanese Philosophy’, and 
was chaired by Derrida himself. Th is was in the wake of the impact of con-
temporary French theory on Japanese thought during the 1970s but also of 
an increase in interest among French theorists on things Japanese. Derrida’s 
involvement also seems signifi cant in light of his critique of Western phono-
centrism.
In the talk, Nakamura begins by discussing the ‘rediscovery of topica’, 
positions Nishida’s ‘logic of place’ within contemporary developments, and 
explicates its connection to the logic of the Japanese language. He raises the 
issue of common sense to show that the split between rationality and sensibil-
ity that is a worldwide issue is keenly felt especially in Japan, and that there is 
a need for philosophers to respond to this (Nakamura 2001b, p. 29). He ex-
plains that this issue was presented in 1930 in Miki’s Logic of the Imagination 
and that his own project of a ‘theory of common sense’ inherits Miki’s ‘logic 
of the imagination’. And in delving into the matter, he also had to inherit the 
issue of place from Nishida (Nakamura 2001b, p. 29-30). His current philo-
sophical undertaking was to shed new light on Nishida’s ‘logic of place’ from 
the standpoint of his own ‘theory of common sense’, and in turn to develop 
his own thinking on the matter (2001b, p. 30). As he states in his prefatory 
note to the essay, his own theory of common sense thus ties into both the is-
sues of place and the imagination and he attempts to make this connection 
explicit in the talk. Th ereby he presents his own theory of common sense that 
he developed after borrowing the term from Aristotle, and relates it to Nish-
ida’s concept of place, as an example of contemporary Japanese philosophy.
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Notes
1 Th roughout this essay I follow the traditional Japanese order of putting the family 
name fi rst and the given personal name second in Japanese names. 
2 E.g., Kansei no kakusei (Th e Awakening of Sensibility) (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1975), 
Patosu no chi (Th e Wisdom of Pathos) (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1982), Rinshō 
no chi towa nanika (What is Clinical Wisdom?) (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1992), Basho 
(Toposu) (Place (Topos)) (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1988), etc.
3 Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul) III, 425a14-19. In discussing the various 
sensory phenomena related to Aristotelian common sense, Nakamura (OCS, 
pp. 43, 309-312.n.23) refers to a number of other authors, most notably 
Japanese psychopathologist and philosopher Kimura Bin as well as to Maurice 
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Merleau-Ponty, who grasped man as a single sensorium commune, an organ of 
common sense.
4 For a detailed explication of Nishida’s theory, see my Introduction to Nishida 
Kitarō, Place and Dialectic: Two Essays by Nishida Kitarō (2011) and my Nishida 
Kitarō’s Chiasmatic Chorology: Place of Dialectic, Dialectic of Place (Krummel 2015).
5 Vico, Il Metodo degli Studi del Tempo Nostro (On the Study Methods of Our Time), III.
6 Vico, Scienza Nuova (Th e New Science) §142 (Vico 1968: 63).
7 Miki expresses this sentiment in a letter from 1945.
8 Here we might remind our readers of how the German for imagination, 
Einbildung, is made up of the word Bildung meaning ‘formation’ or ‘cultivation’, 
in turn including Bild which means ‘image’ but can also mean ‘form’.
9 For the special issue on Japan for the journal Critique (1983, vols. 1-2), Nakamura 
wrote “Nishida: le premier philosophe original au Japan.”
